The common strategy of evergreening using patents and other exclusivity periods likely contributes to the total incentives that justify a pharmaceutical company's investment in a new drug.
T he US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves about 0.02% of all drugs screened 1 and the cost of drug development is estimated to be as high as $1.3 billion 2 . With such long odds and high stakes, the government offers exclusivity periods to allow pharmaceutical companies to capture a market and thereby recover their new-product investments. Specifically, patents may prevent other companies from manufacturing or selling a similar or identical drug, and a company may be awarded a variety of exclusivity periods for successfully receiving specific types of drug approvals. Evergreening, as used herein, refers to strategies to extend monopolies associated with a particular product 1 . For example, after receiving an initial patent or an exclusivity period associated with approval by the FDA of a drug (described in further detail below), a company may pursue a subsequent patent or exclusivity period to add to its total monopoly term.
I analyzed exclusivity periods associated with drugs approved by the FDA from 2000 to 2010. This data suggests that pharmaceutical companies frequently embark on evergreening strategies. The widespread occurrence of evergreening suggests that the strategy itself may contribute to the total incentives that justify a pharmaceutical company's new-drug investments.
Patent-associated exclusivity
If patents and additional FDA approvals are frequently pursued after the FDA initially approves a drug, a drug's exclusivity profile should vary depending on its approval date. Recently approved drugs should be associated with fewer exclusivity periods than older drugs, and should have a shorter 'total' exclusivity term (calculated based on the latest expiration date of multiple exclusivity periods). To investigate this issue, I analyzed patent and FDA-approval exclusivity periods associated with each new drug application (NDA) approved by the FDA from 2000 to 2010 (Box 1). Figure 1 shows data related to patentassociated exclusivity terms. Patents are awarded for new and nonobvious inventions 3 , such as new active ingredients, formulations and methods of using a product. A company sponsoring an NDA must identify any patent claiming the drug or a method of using the reference drug, which could reasonably be asserted 4 . Though the true applicability and validity of a patent may be difficult to assess, the patents listed by companies have been used in this study as an estimate of patents protecting each approved drug. p aT e n T s terms across all approvals within a given year for which at least one patent was associated with the approval. Again, this analysis is not affected by the change in the percentage of NDAs having any associated patent protection. As shown, the maximum post-approval patent term also declines across approval years: from 17.0 years for 2000-approved NDAs to 9.2 years for 2010-approved NDAs.
FDA-approval exclusivity
Pharmaceutical companies can also receive various exclusivity periods for receiving particular types of FDA approvals. If the FDA protected by a shorter patent term. The 'total' patent term combined across patents will depend, for example, on the patents' filing dates and whether they claimed priority to a previous application (as opposed to showing, for example, that a later-filed patent claims an invention that is new and nonobvious over a previously filed patent) 7 . Thus, for each patent, I calculated the post-approval patent term as being the time from the NDA approval to the expiration of the patent. For each NDA associated with at least one patent, I identified the maximum post-approval patent term. Figure 1c shows the average of the maximum post-approval patent
The probability of patent protection declines as a function of a drug's approval date (Fig. 1a) . Although 79% of applications approved in 2000 identified one or more pertinent patents, that percentage drops to 54% for applications approved in 2010.
Each NDA may be associated with more than one patent (e.g., one for a drug's active ingredient and another for a method of using the drug), and each patent application may be filed at a different time. Applications filed as soon as possible typically face less prior art for novelty and nonobviousness assessments 5, 6 . Additionally, early patent grants may provide a pharmaceutical company with increased confidence that it will recover its development expenditures. However, applications filed later may expire at a later date, thereby increasing monopoly profit potential. Filing many patent applications thus may not only increase the total scope of patent protection but also achieve seemingly competing aims.
To investigate patent-filing strategies, for each year, I binned the NDAs approved in that year that were (or were subsequently) associated with at least one patent. I then calculated the average number of patents per NDA within the bin. Even though this analysis was restricted to patent-associated NDAs, the average number of patents per NDA is lower for recently approved drugs (Fig. 1b) . For example, an average of 4.5 patents were associated with NDAs approved in 2000 compared to 2.9 patents for NDAs approved in 2010. This suggests that companies continued to pursue patents after their drugs were approved.
The smaller number of patents associated with recently approved NDAs does not necessarily indicate that these drugs are effectively
Box 1 Methodology
I identified all small-molecule NDAs approved by the FDA from January 2000 to December 2010 by consulting the FDA database of drug approval reports and searching for approvals within a particular month and year 16 .
I also requested and received data from the FDA identifying patents and approvalrelated exclusivities associated with these NDAs 17 . Two data sets were provided.
One data set related to patents publicly identified as being associated with approved NDAs. For each NDA, the data set identified any patents submitted by the sponsoring company to the FDA as claiming the drug product or method of use of the product. This list included patents submitted before the NDA was approved as well as patents submitted since the approval date (though, notably, the company could continue to submit additional patents). For each of the product-associated patents, the FDA provided its expiration date.
A second data set included data identifying all exclusivities awarded based on receiving specific types of approvals. The data set identified the specific exclusivity code (e.g., NCE for a new chemical entity) and the date upon which the awarded exclusivity would expire. Again, this data set included all exclusivity codes assigned to the NDA on the approval date as well as any exclusivity codes tied to the NDA and awarded after the initial approval.
Using NDA numbers, I wrote a computer program in MATLAB to cross-reference applications between the lists. Thus, I could identify, for example, whether a particular NDA that was approved in a given month was associated with any patents or approvalrelated exclusivities. I calculated the percentage of NDAs with particular characteristics (e.g., having one or more associated patents) and identified and averaged variables (e.g., the number of associated patents) across NDAs, as described in the main text. PAT E N T s ent and propellant in a particular weight ratio. The patent with the latest expiration date (US patent 7,500,444) claims a specific mechanical configuration of an actuation indicator (e.g., to count the number of doses administered by a device). Thus, it appears as if it would be easier for a competitor to design around the later patent as compared to the earlier patent. However, although later-pursued exclusivity periods may be of smaller scope than initial periods, they may nonetheless provide some additional profit opportunities.
Conclusions
Pharmaceutical companies appear to frequently engage in an evergreening strategy to extend both total patent monopolies and total FDA-granted exclusivities. Simply characterizing drug-related monopolies using fixed terms (e.g., 20 years from filing a patent application or 5 years after receiving FDA approval) would therefore overlook the more complex timeevolving and scope-varying approach taken by pharmaceutical companies when pursuing exclusivity periods. Studies have shown that pharmaceutical companies will expand their R&D programs as the industry is presented with greater profit opportunities 15 . The suggested prevalence of evergreening may indicate that pharmaceutical companies' current R&D efforts are in part supported by the additional exclusivities offered by this approach.
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studies warranting a 6-month extension of its exclusivity period, it would be associated with two codes. Even within this restricted data set, more recently approved drugs are associated with fewer FDA-approval exclusivity periods than previously approved drugs (5.6 periods for 2000-approved drugs versus 2.0 periods for 2010-approved drugs) (Fig. 2b) .
As with patents, the number of exclusivity periods is not indicative of the total exclusivity term. Rather, the total term may depend on the date that particular approvals were granted and the length of the periods. Thus, I calculated a maximum FDA-approval exclusivity term as the time between the NDA's approval and the expiration of the final FDA-approval exclusivity term. Figure 2c shows that recently approved drugs are associated with shorter total terms than older drugs (6.4 years for 2000-approved drugs versus 3.6 years for 2010-approved drugs). The patent with the earliest expiration date (US patent 6,251,368) claims an aerosol formulation including a specific active ingrediapproves a new active ingredient, it cannot approve any other drug containing that active ingredient for five years 8 . Even if an application pertains to an old active ingredient, three years of exclusivity are granted if the application includes new clinical investigations (other than bioavailability studies) essential to the approval of the application and conducted or sponsored by the company 9 . For example, new clinical trials may be required in instances in which a company is seeking approval of a new dosage strength, dosage form, route of administration, indication, dosage schedule, patient population or drug-release profile 10 . If a company that received a previous approval intends to effect an important change to the drug offered for sale (e.g., changing the drug's dosage), it must file a supplemental (s)NDA. If an sNDA is approved and includes new clinical investigations (other than bioavailability studies) essential to the approval of the supplement, the company is awarded an additional three-year exclusivity period with respect to the new feature of the drug supported by the clinical trials 11 . If a drug is approved to treat a rare disease, the sponsoring company receives a seven-year exclusivity period under the Orphan Drug Act 12 . Finally, if a company completes FDA-requested pediatric clinical studies, the company may receive an additional six months of exclusivity 13 . This pediatric exclusivity may be added to any other exclusivity period pertaining to the drug (including the exclusivity period secured by a patent listed by the company in its FDA application) 14 . The FDA has assigned a unique code to each type of exclusivity period.
Evergreening in practice
More recently approved drugs are less likely to be associated with an FDA-approval exclusivity period than are drugs with earlier approval dates (Fig. 2a) . For example, 78% of NDAs approved in 2000 have been granted an FDA-approval exclusivity period, compared to only 54% of 2010-approved NDAs.
Pediatric testing and sNDAs provide opportunities for a sponsoring company to receive additional exclusivity periods after its drug is initially approved. Comparing the number of exclusivity periods for recently approved drugs to older drugs may provide an indication as to whether companies were frequently obtaining post-approval exclusivities. Thus, for each year between 2000 and 2010, I identified NDAs approved in that year having at least one exclusivity period granted by the FDA. I then determined the average number of such exclusivity periods associated with these NDAs. For example, if a drug company was awarded a five-year exclusivity period for successfully completing trials on a new chemical entity, and if it also performed pediatric PAT E N T s
